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Abstract 
The paper presents a model-based approach describing the impacts of climate change on the 
European energy system. Existing analyses only estimate a limited range of climate impacts over a 
limited geographical area. Using the POLES model and the results from several climate models, the 
present paper quantifies the main impacts of climate change on the European energy sector, country 
by country, thus achieving progress in this direction. As far as energy demand is concerned, our main 
finding is that higher temperatures will mean that air-conditioning will consume more energy, reaching 
about 53 Mtoe by 2100 in a scenario with no strong emissions constraints (A1B). On the other hand 
less energy will be consumed for heating buildings, falling by about 65 Mtoe per year. This represents 
a net decrease in energy consumption of about 12 Mtoe by 2100. On the supply side, more 
constrained and expensive operating conditions for electric power plants will result in lower electricity 
generation by thermal, nuclear and hydro-power plants, with a maximum decrease of about 200 TWh 
in 2070 in the A1B scenario and 150 TWh in 2060 and 2080 for a low emissions scenario (E1). These 
effects vary a great deal across Europe and remain very dependent on the uncertainties affecting the 
results of the various climate models. This overall uncertainty may inhibit effective decisions. However 
the study offers insights not otherwise available without the full coverage of the energy system 
provided by POLES and climate features provided by climate models. The study identifies the main 
impacts of climate change in a strategic sector and provides an “order of magnitude” or “central trend” 
for these impacts, which might be useful in an adaptive policy of act, learn and then act again. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: climate impacts, climate change, costs of the impacts of climate change. 
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1. Introduction  
Weather and climate affect all major aspects of the energy sector, with major implications for 
energy demand and electricity generation. On the demand side, warmer winter temperatures in cold 
regions may reduce energy demand because less space-heating will be required. On the other hand, 
higher temperatures during summer months in warm regions will lead to more demand for electricity to 
run air-conditioners and refrigerators. Changes in precipitation will impact the potential of hydropower, 
positively or negatively depending on the region considered. Although the literature discussing these 
issues is becoming more substantial (Lehner et al., 2005; Wilbanks et al., 2008; Isaac et al., 2009; 
Mideksa et al., 2010; Petrick et al., 2010; Pilli-Sihvola et al., 2010; Mima et al., 2011). Only a few 
studies fully account for all the main climate impacts on the energy sector, covering all European 
countries. Existing studies evaluate only a limited range of climate impacts over limited geographical 
areas. Here we combine the results of several climate models with a version of the POLES model 
which has been specially developed to produce a broad picture of the most important climate impacts 
on energy supply and demand. Although we cover more impacts, in a more detailed geographical area 
than in previous studies, we do not claim to be complete. Research on this issue is quite challenging 
due to the lack of globally compiled datasets and the limited number of earlier studies. We started with 
a simple model and the figures reported should be treated as rough estimates of the nature and 
magnitude of impacts and their respective costs under average climate prospects as performed in the 
framework of the ClimateCost project1. Moreover the results shed light on the relative importance of 
various impact drivers. 
This study is in fact one of the first estimates to cover four types of climate impact on the energy 
system of each European country, broken down by energy source and tested for about 10 climate-
policy model runs and two types of scenario: a medium-high emissions scenario (A1B) and a low 
emissions mitigation scenario (E1) (see Nakicenovic et al, 2000). Because of its detailed 
representation of the energy system, the POLES model has been considered as suitable for 
calculating the major impacts of climate change on the energy sector through the development of soft 
links with climate models and some particular developments on: 
− Changes in energy consumption for heating and cooling in the residential and tertiary 
sectors, according to different levels of climate change;  
− Variations in resource availability for generating electricity with hydro plants; 
− Increased cooling constraint impacting thermal-power generation, using fossil or nuclear fuel.  
In this framework POLES provides insights into the interaction between climate change, energy 
use, and economics. The following section presents the model-based approach adopted for analyzing 
possible impacts of climate change. Results and a discussion of climate impacts on energy supply and 
                                                     
1 ClimateCost (Full Costs of Climate Change) is a Collaborative project funded by the European Commission 
under the Seventh Framework Programme. Grant agreement no.: 212774 
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demand in the EU are presented in the third section. The fourth and final section summarizes some 
conclusions and possibilities for further extension.  
 
 
2. Measuring the impacts of the climate change on energy supply and 
demand with the POLES model 
2.1. POLES model capability 
The Prospective Outlook for Long-term Energy Systems (POLES) model is a widely 
recognized partial equilibrium model, with a dynamic year-by-year simulation process, simulating the 
global energy system, from the present day till 2100. It is market-oriented, which means that market 
equilibrium prices drive the balance of supply and demand for each type of energy. Separate modules 
represent the national energy balances and the international markets for the world energy system in 
57 countries and regions. In this framework, the EU is broken down into 27 Member States. 
The model was developed by the EDDEN2 research group, in order to study international 
energy issues, technology development and global environmental strategies. Population and 
economic growth scenarios are exogenous variables. The structure of the POLES model is 
summarized in the following figure, showing interconnected modules (final demand, power generation 
including renewables, fossil fuel supply, international energy markets and prices), at the national, 
regional and global level (Criqui and Mima, 2006). 
Figure 1: Structure of the POLES model 
57
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For each country or region, the POLES model implements three main modules that represent: 
i) final energy demand by fuel and main sector; ii) the electricity transformation system; and iii) the 
fossil fuel supply. Final energy demand by fuel is a function of three main determinants: short and 
long-term price effects, income or activity elasticities and an autonomous technological trend. For each 
period, the current demand for each individual fuel is reduced by a "scrapping factor" corresponding to 
the phasing-out rate of existing energy consuming equipment. The difference between total demand 
and the sum of "scrapped demands" being positive, the corresponding "gap" must be filled by new 
plants. Substitution between energy carriers takes place in the mix of these new plants, which 
depends on the relative total-user cost (investment and fuel cost) of the energy carriers. Demand for 
each fuel is therefore the sum of the scrapped demand and the share of the corresponding gap for the 
relevant sector. This allows for “putty-clay” behaviour in energy demand and substitutions. As the 
model also identifies separately electricity demand for non-heating purposes and for space-heating 
(including a share of electricity for heating), it is possible to identify the dual pressure exerted by 
climate change on the electricity sector during heat waves: electricity demand will rise due to extra 
consumption for cooling whereas, as we shall see below, thermal production may be constrained by 
the increased temperature of cooling water. 
Once the demand by sector and by fuel has been calculated it is re-aggregated to calculate 
the total final energy demand by fuel, to become an input of the New and Renewable Energy and 
Electricity and Transformation System modules. After the necessary capacity expansion has been 
determined, the model then calculates the production mix of electricity from the given capacity 
structure by loading plants using a merit-order rule until demand is satisfied, while giving priority to 
plants with the lowest variable costs (not total costs). The power-production model distinguishes 
between “must-run” technologies: technologies with low (or zero) variable costs that will in any case 
deliver their production; and merit-order technologies with substantial variable production costs.  
Several of the production options (e.g. hydro-electricity) are associated with resource and 
technical potentials which may limit their development. Use of hydroelectric plants typically depends 
on the water supply available, which varies considerably by region and season. Capacity expansion is 
thus a function of the technical potential and the gap between hydroelectric production costs and 
baseload-electricity prices. The POLES model produces robust economic assessments based on the 
costs of implementing new technologies, drawing on rigorous analysis of the engineering and scientific 
fundamentals. 
Endogenous calculation of international energy prices is one of the key features of the 
POLES model. International price equations are at the very heart of the recursive process which 
accounts for the dynamics of the lagged adjustments of energy supply and demand. Domestic energy 
prices are deduced from the variation of import prices, derived in turn from variations in international 
prices. Consequently the model checks that subsidized domestic prices (lower than import prices) do 
not decrease when international prices decrease unless the latter fall below previous domestic prices. 
The model can also take account of alternative internal taxation policies on energy fuels. 
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For this study, we draw on a set of new developments of the model designed to assess the 
potential impacts of climate change on energy demand and energy supply, through variations in 
temperature, precipitation or water regime. 
 
2.2. Improvements to the POLES model  
To investigate the changes in energy supply and demand due to long-term shifts in 
temperature and precipitation, we have added new drivers, such as temperature and precipitation 
changes, to the functional forms of the POLES model, also making allowance for the non-linear nature 
of their impacts on energy supply and demand. These non-linearities correspond to thresholds in the 
consequences of rising temperatures: consumption thresholds, with cooling equipment being installed 
and operated depending on the frequency and intensity of heat waves; production thresholds, when 
thermal generation must be stopped because the temperature of a plant’s coolant exceeds 
established standards. Further additions to the model concern residential and tertiary demand for 
heating and cooling, and the supply of thermal, nuclear and hydro-electricity generation. The model 
accounts for interaction between these effects, reflecting the corresponding changes in generation 
costs, power plant installation and electricity prices. 
2.2.1. Modelling the impacts of climate change on heating demand  
In recent years some attention has focused on the relationship between residential and tertiary 
demand for heating energy and expected temperatures variations. Some contributions (Bigano et al., 
2006; De Cian, 2007; Rongetal, 2007; Sailor, 2001) provide empirical analysis and fuel specific studies 
by country. The results of these studies can be used as data for impact analysis. Before 2009 such 
studies hardly existed at a global level. Isaac and Van Vuuren (2009) attempted to describe residential 
heating and cooling demand in the context of climate change for the first time at a global level, using 
simple relationships to describe heating and cooling demand. Petrick & alii (2010) also investigated 
the links between rising global temperature and global energy use, based on a panel of 157 countries 
over three decades and limited to the residential sector. Compared to previous papers, they 
introduced better geographical coverage, including both developed and developing countries and they 
considered non-linearities in the impact of temperature on energy demand as well as temperature-
income interactions. They showed lower energy use with rising temperatures due to reduced demand 
for heating energy, with the gap compared to consumption “without climate change” increasing over 
time and with rising temperatures. Furthermore, they demonstrated that the response of energy use is 
affected by the level of temperature and income (Petrick & alii (2010), p. 2). 
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Much research has translated changes in average temperature on a daily, seasonal, or annual 
basis into heating-degree-days (HDD)3, which are then used in energy simulation models to project 
demand for space-heating (Wilkoks & alii, 2008, p. 73). We follow the same approach to investigate 
the links between rising regional temperature and global energy use. The POLES model already 
estimates energy-heating demand by fuel type (oil, gas, biomass and electricity) driven by fuel prices 
and building surfaces, the latter depending positively on per capita GDP. We add to this heating 
demand the variation in HDD for each year, compared to the HDD of the base year (2010), with 
a temperature elasticity (α ) provided by the literature4. From the initial heating demand (HDEM, for 
country C and fuel F), we estimate heating demand with the impact of climate change (HDEMCC, for 
country C and fuel F) as below: 
HDEMCC [C, F] =  HDEM[C, F] * (
2010HDD
HDD
)  
The same methodology is used for the tertiary sector. The impact of temperature changes on 
residential or tertiary energy consumption can be measured as the difference in energy consumption 
taking into account climate change, or not. Multiplying the absolute impacts by the average energy 
price for heating in the residential or tertiary sectors in the relevant region yields the variation in energy 
costs associated with the impacts of climate change. The average energy price of heating is calculated 
as the weighted average of prices and quantities of substitutable energies used for heating in the 
residential or tertiary sectors in each region, while taking into account systemic effects and feedbacks 
on price and demand levels.   
2.2.2. Modelling the impacts of climate change on the cooling demand 
An important impact of higher summer temperatures in many European countries will be the 
accelerated growth of electricity consumption for space-cooling, with significant impacts on peak 
electricity demand in the summer. However, few papers propose a clear methodology to measure 
these effects. McNeil and Letschert (2007) were the first to propose an appropriate approach to this 
issue. Isaack and van Vuuren (2009) developed this approach further in their paper on “Modelling 
global residential sector energy use for heating and air conditioning in the context of climate Change” 
and we applied their propositions in the framework of the POLES model. Firstly, we model the 
changes in air-conditioner ownership and secondly average unit energy consumption for a typical 
benchmark equipment. 
- Average air conditioning equipment rate (ACER[C], for country C)  is obtained by multiplying 
air-conditioning availability (AVRES[C]) by the climate maximum saturation rate (CMAX[C]).  
    ACER [C] =  AVRES [C] * CMAX [C]      (1) 
                                                     
3 The Heating-Degree-Day (HDD) variable is based on the number of degrees Celsius by which the daily mean temperature 
((the maximum temperature on day i  - the minimum temperature on day i)/2) falls below 18ºC. The HDD values are added up 
for all the days in the year when the mean temperature falls below 18 ºC.  
4 = 1.8 in our case 
 
α 
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- Residential Air Conditioning Availability (AVRES[C]) is dependent on revenue following a 
logistic S-curve:   
AVRES[C] =  
)e*e( ]C[GDPPOP*.).( 2307831
1
0.
                           (2) 
- Climate maximum saturation depends on the heating-degree-days (CDD)5.  
CMAX[C]= 1-0.95 * exp(-0.0019 * CDD2010[C])                  (3) 
- Air-conditioning unit energy consumption per square metre (ACUEC[C] ) depends on 
heating-degree-days, but there is a significant dependence on income too. Based on the Morna Isaac 
and Detlef Van Vuuren equation and data collected from the literature, we propose the following 
equation. 
ACUEC[C,t] = ACUEC[C,t-1] * 
]1t[
CDD
CDD ]t[
0
  *  
)b)GDPPOPln(*a(
)b)GDPPOPln(*a(
]1t[
]t[
.
.
0
             (4) 
Where:  a = 7.27*10-0.8, b = 8.74 * 10-0.5 
The logarithm takes into account saturation effects for high income levels. Finally electricity 
consumption for space-cooling is obtained by multiplying residential surfaces (RESSURF), calculated 
endogenously by the model, with average air conditioning equipment rates and air-conditioning unit 
energy consumption per square metre.  
ECOOL [C] = RESSURF [C]* ACER [C] * ACUEC [C]  
The assessment of the energy costs associated with the impacts of climate warming on 
heating and cooling energy demand results from the multiplication of the absolute impacts on energy 
consumption (in tonne-oil-equivalent) with the average energy price of energy inputs for heating or 
cooling in the residential and tertiary sector estimated endogenously by the POLES model (in real 
value, undiscounted). 
  
2.2.3. Modelling the impacts of climate change on nuclear and conventional 
thermal power generation 
Climate change is likely to constrain thermal electricity generation in the 21st century by 
degrading cooling capability and power-plant efficiency. Conventional thermal and nuclear power 
stations are major users of water cooling and ongoing maintenance. The amount of water used for 
power plant cooling also varies according to each plant’s electricity generating technology and size. 
For example, nuclear reactors require the largest amount of water for cooling, followed by baseload 
fossil fuel power plants.  
                                                     
5 The Cooling-Degree-Day (CDD) variable is based on energy needed for cooling. To derive it, the number of degrees Celsius 
by which the daily mean temperature exceeds 18 ºC is calculated for every day of the year and added up for all corresponding 
days of the year. 
 8 
Thermoelectric power generation will also be vulnerable to fluctuations in the quantity of 
water supply. “While there is uncertainty in the nature and amount of change in water availability in 
specific locations, there is agreement among climate models that there will be a redistribution of water 
as well as changes in the availability by season” (Wilbanks & alii., 2008). Historically, summertime 
weather extremes have forced thermoelectric units to be throttled back or shut down to comply with 
environmental or safety limits on water temperature. Thermoelectric power plants also become less 
efficient as the ambient air temperature increases.  
The effects of higher temperatures on power plants have received much attention in the last 
years (Szolnoky et al. (1997) ; Mohseni & Stefan (1999) ; Durmayaz et al. (2006); Förster & Lilliestam 
(2009)). All these studies emphasize that two different temperature effects influence the output of 
thermal power plants: one is the availability factor, the other is the generation efficiency of power 
plants. The POLES model allows for both these effects, using temperature values supplied by East 
Anglia University, together with assumptions for efficiency changes based on the literature. Durmayaz 
et al. (2006), roughly estimate that “the impact of 1°C increase in the temperature of the coolant 
extracted from environment is predicted to yield a decrease of about 0.12-0.45% in the power output 
and the thermal efficiency of the pressurized-water reactor nuclear-power plant”. It is also necessary to 
derive river temperatures from air temperatures. Mohseni & Stefan (1999) propose some linear 
regressions of stream temperature versus air temperature in order to assess the impact of higher air 
temperatures on water temperatures in rivers.  
Two intermediary variables are calculated to take into account the impact of climate change 
on availability (coefficient applied to the availability factor, CTACAF[C]) and on the efficiency of thermal 
technologies (coefficient applied to efficiency, CTACEF[C]). The impacts on availability and efficiency 
are calculated as a function of the impact of a 1°C increase in the temperature of the coolant drawn 
from the environment, of the variation in heating-degree-days, and the coefficient which derives the 
river temperature from air temperature. 
CTACAF[C]= IACAF[C]*(CDD[C]-CDD2010[C])* TAW[C] 
CTACEF[C]= IACEF[C]*(CDD[C]-CDD2010[C])* TAW[C]      
where: 
TAW[C] (0.7 in our case
6) is the change in river temperatures due to a 1°C variation in air 
temperature. 
and IACAF[C,T]  and IACEF[C,T]  are the impacts of a 1°C increase in the temperature of the 
coolant drawn from the environment on the availability and efficiency of thermal power plants of 
technology T. 
The resulting availability and efficiency values for thermal technologies are therefore: 
                                                     
6 Jean C. Morrill, Roger C. Bales and Martha H Conklin find that an increase in water temperature of about 0.6-
0.8°C for every 1°C increase in air temperature. 
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ACAFCC[C,T]  = ACAF[C,T] *(1- CTACAF [C] ) 
ACEFCC[C,T] = ACEF[C,T] *(1- CTACEF[C] ) 
 
2.2.4. Modelling the impact of climate change on hydropower generation 
Climate change will also have an impact on hydropower plants. Factors such as the timing 
and geographical patterns of precipitations, temperatures, evaporation or snow-melt affect stream flow 
and reservoir levels. While precipitation changes may vary, depending on the geographical area and 
season, evaporation is expected to rise everywhere due to higher temperatures. Hence, considerable 
changes in discharge regimes are expected for the future as a consequence of climate change. 
Moreover, not all national electricity systems are equally affected, because some are more reliant on 
hydroelectricity than others. 
Our study was a first attempt to take into account some of climate change impacts. We do’nt 
claim to provide a complete explanation of the subject. Indeed evaporative water loss from the 
reservoir surfaces is an important factor but it is very difficult to measure. Evaporation relies not only 
on temperature increase but also on wind speeds, humidity and solar radiation and the importance of 
each of these drivers is regionally dependent. There is no easy way to disaggregate on a national 
level the end uses for hydroelectric dam water into irrigation, flood control, municipal water, and 
thermoelectric power plant cooling. Direct measurements of evaporation are scarce, and different 
evaporation calculation equations give different estimates of absolute evaporation rates and sensitivity 
to change. Therefore, it can be very difficult to compare results from different studies. For all these 
reasons the estimation of the impact of the climate change on the evaporative water loss from 
reservoir surfaces is beyond the scope of this paper. We did not found any estimation of how does it 
affect the results. This may be subject for further studies in the future. 
In order to account for the future climate change impacts on hydroelectricity, we rely on 
information about changing hydropower potentials available in the literature (Lehner et al. (2005) for 
European countries), and on the changes in the precipitations as provided by East Anglia University. 
Lehner et al. (2005) estimated the impacts of climate change on hydropower potential for individual 
countries in the EU. The authors calculated the influence of climate change on gross hydropower 
potential as well as its impacts on existing hydro capacity.  
The change in technical potential due to climate change also affects economic potential and 
consequently hydroelectricity generation. Two changes consequently had to be made to the POLES 
model:  
a. climate change impacts on the available capacity factor (ACAFCC[C]) for existing 
hydropower capacities, enabling the impact in terms of hydro generation to be calculated:  
ACAFCC[C] = ACAF[C]*(
]C[
]C[
Rain
Rain
2010
) 
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b. changes in hydropower technical potential due to the impact of climate change 
(POTHYDCC[C]). 
POTHYDCC[C] = POTHYD[C]*(
]C[
]C[
Rain
Rain
2010
) 
Where: POTHYD [C] is the technical potential of hydropower plants by country in the reference case, 
precipitations by country (rain[C]) for each year compared to the base year (rain2010[C]) as provided by 
East Anglia University. 
The total impact is calculated as the difference in hydroelectricity production in the version of 
the model that takes into account the impacts of climate change and the initial model. Finally, the 
impact of climate change on electricity generation alters the generation mix, which obviously impacts 
the average production cost of electricity. For that reason, we first estimate the total cost of electricity 
generation for each country in the scenarios with and without climate impacts. Then the global impact 
of climate change on thermal, nuclear and hydroelectricty generation is assessed as the difference 
between these two total electricity generation costs.  
Until now there has been no means of estimating the costs of the impact of extreme heat 
waves and droughts, which may place the most severe climate-related strains on the electricity sector. 
During a heat wave, electricity demand on the hottest days – when an overstressed energy sector 
could be a critical issue, with local grids operating at the limits of their capacity simply because of the 
many air-conditioning units operating simultaneously. At the same time supply maybe limited by 
insufficient availability of coolant. Heat waves and droughts (both expected to become more common, 
according to the IPCC) may in these situations of shortage push the costs of electricity well beyond the 
costs included in our model.  
2.3. Data and methodology 
To calculate the shifts in energy supply and demand caused by the impacts of changes in 
heating and cooling demand, two elements are needed: regional data on temperature and 
precipitation, and a model to convert changes in temperature and precipitations, respectively, into 
heating or cooling requirements, and nuclear and hydroelectric electricity generation.  
To assess these effects, the existing POLES demand model has been improved to allow for 
heating-degree-days (HDD), heating-degree-days (CDD), changes in precipitation obtained from the 
High Resolution Gridded Dataset of the Climate Research Unit at University of East Anglia and from 
the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, as part of world-energy trends described in two 
emission scenarios of the IPCC Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES, Nakicenovic et al. 
2000).  
The first one is the SRES A1B scenario, a medium-high emission scenario, based on the 
IPCC A1 storyline with a future world of rapid economic growth, new and more efficient technologies 
and strong convergence between regions. The A1B scenario adopts a balanced contribution by the 
various energy sources (fossil and renewable), with comparable technological changes in the energy 
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system. This scenario has been extensively used in recent EU regional climate modelling studies, 
notably in the Ensembles7 study. For this reason, it has also been used in the ClimateCost project. It 
reflects a medium-high emission trajectory and leads to long term (2100) median estimates for global 
average surface temperature increases of about 3.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels.  
The second case is the Ensembles E1 scenario (van der Linden et al. 2009; Lowe et al., 
2009), a mitigation scenario leading to low emissions and long-term stabilization at 450 ppm CO2eq. It 
would thus limit global warming to less than 2°C with a reasonable degree of probability. Furthermore, 
the study has integrated uncertainty by considering about 10 alternative climate model outputs for 
each of these scenarios.  
 
3. Results and discussion 
3.1. Impacts of climate change on heating and cooling energy demand in the 
European residential and tertiary sector  
3.1.1. Impacts of climate change on heating demand 
In the European Union 37% of all final energy is consumed in buildings by households and 
the commercial and tertiary sectors and more than half of this energy (57%) is used for heating. 
According to the initial POLES simulations, which do not consider temperature levels and variations 
(see figure 2, black columns - BL A1B), EU27 energy demand for heating in the residential sector is 
expected to decrease because of fuel-price increases, energy-efficiency policies (separate from 
climate concerns) and technology improvements. As can be expected, the decrease in energy 
consumption is greater in the climate mitigation scenario (down 60% in E1), because of the higher 
carbon value, than in the case without mitigation (down 33% in A1B). Comparison of this heating 
demand (black columns) with other simulation runs which take into account HDD variation (see 
various grey columns), shows an even larger decrease in energy consumption. The gap between them 
(represented by the black area at the top) corresponds to the impact of climate change on heating-
energy demand. As expected, the relative impact is much more important in the scenario without 
mitigation policies (i.e. A1B). The margins of uncertainty however enlarge in time, from -15 to -35% by 
2100 at European level for A1B scenarios and from -2% to -24% for E1 scenarios. The impacts in the 
tertiary sector, are slightly more important in absolute figures, but comparable in relative terms. 
                                                     
7 The Ensembles project is supported by the European Commission under the 6th Framework Programme 2002-2006. 
Ensembles uses the collective expertise of 66 institutes to produce a reliable quantitative risk assessment of long-term climate 
change and its impacts. 
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Figure 2: EU27 heating consumption in the residential sector in A1B and E1 scenarios 
(baseline compared to various sets of climate change data)8 
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Source: POLES model, PACTE – pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project 
 
 
Climate impacts on heating demand vary widely between regions. The impact on residential 
heating consumption in the western part of the EU (referred to as western Europe here) is greater than 
elsewhere: in the A1B scenarios, respectively two, three and more than four times greater than in 
southern, northern and eastern EU countries in 2100. Also the impact is greater in the A1B scenarios 
than in the E1 scenarios. For instance, in western Europe the impact is twice as high in the A1B 
scenarios than in the E1 scenarios. The impact and corresponding gap strongly increases during the 
period in the A1B scenarios, while it is more limited in the E1 scenarios.  
 
                                                     
8 In this graph BL A1B and BL E1 show projections of heating consumption for POLES runs without taking into account climate 
change ; BC2M2, EGMAM1, EGMAM2, EGMAM3, IPCM4, MPEH5_1, MPEH5_3, DMIEH5, HAGEM are alternative results with 
HDD from climate models for A1B scenario; CNCM33, EGMAM2-2, EGMAM2-3, IPCM4v2_1, IPCM4v2_2, IPCM4v2_3, 
MPEH5C_1, MPEH5C_2, MPEH5C_3, HADCM3C, HADGEM2 are results with HDD of climate models runs for E1 scenario. 
Similar presentation has been applied for other following graphs with and without taking into account of the climate change. 
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Figure 3: EU27 climate impacts on heating consumption in residential sector in A1B 
scenario by region 
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Source: POLES model, PACTE - pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project  
 
3.1.2. Climate change impacts on electricity use for space-cooling 
So far, in most European countries, the amount of energy required for heating has been 
much greater than the energy used for space-cooling. The EU air-conditioning market is much smaller 
than in the United States and Japan. In the US and Japan 65% and 85% respectively of households 
are fitted with air-conditioning, compared with only 5% in Europe. The corresponding figures for 
commercial buildings are 80% in the US, 100% in Japan and 27% in Europe9. However, due to 
increasingly frequent heat waves, rising demand for comfort, improved affordability and more efficient 
air-cooling products, air-conditioning uptake is rising fast in Europe. This rapid diffusion is expected to 
accelerate with climate change. At the same time the efficiency and affordability of cooling devices is 
improving. 
Energy statistics in many countries fail to distinguish electricity used for cooling. This may 
have not been a problem in the past due to the relative insignificance of cooling in terms of the total 
energy delivered in some regions. But it certainly is now and will remain so. Good quality data is 
essential for improving short and long-term projections of demand for energy to cool or heat buildings. 
Residential cooling-energy demand in Europe is projected to increase rapidly, mostly driven 
by the increase in cooling degree-days and equipment rates. As a result, in the A1B scenario EU27 
                                                     
9 Source: High Efficiency and Low Environmental Impact Air Conditioning Systems, Centre for Energy Studies; France, 2003 
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electricity use for space-cooling, when climate change is taken into account, is expected to increase 
by about 3% per year through the century (see Figure 4, grey columns). According to the climate 
projections used in our study, analysis shows a wide variation in increases ranging from 13% to 85% 
in 2050, and up to twice as much in 2100 for the A1B scenarios with climate change (compared to the 
A1B scenario without impacts of climate change). The gap between the two simulations is much 
smaller in the E1 scenario. In the low-mitigation scenarios, due to a low initial level in air-conditioning 
equipment and high expected increase in cooling degree-days, a large increase in electricity demand 
for residential cooling is to be expected.  
In the tertiary sector cooling-electricity demand is expected to increase by a factor of almost 
four in the A1B scenario from 2020 to the end of the period, even when the impacts of climate change 
are not taken into account. Of course, cooling-electricity demand is higher in the scenarios which do 
take into account climate change (see Figure 4, bottom graphs) but relatively speaking the impact is 
less significant than in the residential sector.  
Figure 4: EU27 cooling consumption in residential and tertiary sector in A1B and E1 
scenarios 
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As may be expected, the impacts vary from region to region within the EU. Figure 5 shows 
the evolution of the impact of climate change on energy consumption estimates for space-cooling in 
the residential sector, by region, in the A1B scenarios, compared with the baseline without impacts. 
Western and southern Europe are the most impacted regions. The impact on peak-electricity demand 
in the summer may be significant in southern European countries, but in the absence of suitable data 
availability we were unable to quantify this impact in the present study.  
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Figure 5: Impact of climate change and increase in EU27 electricity consumption for 
space-cooling in the residential sector by region in the A1B scenario 
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Source:  
POLES model, PACTE - pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project10 
 
3.2. Climate change impacts on the energy supply  
Climate change could potentially influence most electricity generation technologies. Air and 
water temperatures, as well as rainfall may adversely affect electrical generation efficiencies 
particularly for nuclear and fossil-based thermal generation and for hydroelectric power plants. In 
some cases water scarcity may even alter new power plant investment decisions. The most direct 
climate impacts are related to water availability for power-plant cooling, as drought conditions may 
seriously jeopardize energy production. The amount of water used for nuclear and conventional 
thermal power plant cooling varies depending on the specific generating technology and size. Nuclear 
reactors, for example, require large amounts of water for cooling, followed by baseload fossil-fuel 
power plants. 
                                                     
10 western Europe : Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland. 
northern Europe : Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom 
southern Europe : Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Yugoslavia 
eastern Europe : Bulgaria, Cezch Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
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“While there is uncertainty in the nature and amount of change in water availability in specific 
locations, there is agreement among climate models that there will be a redistribution of water as well 
as changes in the availability by season” (Wilbanks & alii., 2008). In recent years, summertime 
weather extremes have already required several thermoelectric units to be throttled back or shut 
down, to comply with environmental or safety limits on water temperature. Rising temperatures and 
lower river levels may reduce the efficiency of thermal power plants, due to pumps consuming more 
power to maintain the desired condensing temperatures, or shifts from wet to dry-cooling tower 
systems (Förster, 2009). Climate change is thus likely to further constrain thermoelectric generation in 
the 21st century, by degrading cooling capability and power-plant efficiency. It is worth recalling that 
the problem may be exacerbated by the likely combination of these effects with periods of high 
demand for cooling (Com, 2009).  
Hydropower plants will also be affected by climate change. Factors such as the timing and 
geographical pattern of precipitations, temperature or snow-melt will affect stream flows and reservoir 
levels. At the same time scanty or heavy rain may hinder or boost hydropower generation, depending 
on the geographical area and season. In all cases evaporation is expected to rise due to higher 
temperatures, thus limiting the production potential. Hence, considerable changes in discharge 
regimes are expected for the future as a consequence of climate change. Moreover, not all countries 
are equally affected because some are more reliant on hydroelectricity than others. 
 
3.2.1. Climate change impacts on nuclear and conventional thermal 
generation 
Without taking into account the impacts of the climate change conventional thermal and 
nuclear power stations supply more than 85% of the electricity in the EU. Although this share is 
expected to fall to about 70% in A1B and 60% in E1 by 2100, their output may reach 6,000 TWh in 
A1B and 3,600 TWh in E1 (see Figure 6), respectively 2.5 and 1.3 times current thermal production.  
Figure 6: EU27 electricity production and mix (2000-2100) 
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
TW
h
EU27 Electricity generation - A1B
Other 
renewables
Hydro
1iomass
euclear
2oal , l ignite
eatura l gas
Oi l
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
TW
h
EU27 Electricity generation - E1
Other 
renewables
Hydro
1iomass
euclear
2oal , l ignite
eatura l gas
Oi l
   
 17 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
EU27 Electricity generation mix - A1B
Other 
renewables
Hydro
1iomass
euclear
2oal , l ignite
eatura l gas
Oi l
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
EU27 Electricity generation mix - E1
Other 
renewables
Hydro
1iomass
euclear
2oal , l ignite
eatura l gas
 
Source: POLES model, PACTE - pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project  
 
However, at this stage, these projections do not take account of higher river temperatures, 
lower stream flows, heat waves and higher temperatures associated with climate change, all of which 
are expected to place considerable strains on the thermal power sector, reducing efficiency and 
raising electricity costs. Signs of these changes are increasingly jeopardizing nuclear power reliability. 
In France, for instance, where 0.02 cubic kilometres of water are drawn annually to cool nuclear 
facilities, heat waves in 2003 caused a shutdown or reduction of output in 17 plants, forcing the nation 
to import electricity at more than 10 times the normal cost (Ackerman and ali. 2008). 
Simulations which take into account higher air and water temperatures due to climate 
change show that fossil-based thermal and nuclear power generation could potentially be constrained, 
by as much as 2-3% and 4-5% of annual production, respectively. This means 150 TWh per year less 
due to higher temperatures in the A1B scenarios. The results below indicate divergence from the 
future baseline due to climate change (see Figure 7). This amount corresponds to the production of 
about 20 nuclear plants, which is far from negligible.  
Figure 7: Impact of climate change on EU27 energy supply in the A1B scenarios 
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The profiles obviously differ significantly between countries as the signs of future warming 
vary across the EU. Western and southern European countries are projected to see greater warming, 
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more extreme seasonal patterns, with greater summer increases. Similar patterns are found for 
precipitations, with decreases predicted in regions already suffering from water scarcity11. 
3.2.2. Climate change impacts on hydropower generation 
While hydroelectric power is expected to be an important source of renewable electricity 
growth in a context of low-carbon energy policies, changes in discharge and rising temperatures will 
impact hydrology in each region and affect hydro-electricity generation. Precipitation may vary, 
increasing or decreasing depending on the region and season, but evaporation is expected to rise in 
all cases, due to higher temperatures (Christensen et al., 2011). In the EU hydropower now makes up 
about 10% of total installed capacity, generating 352 TWh in 2010, and there is strong motivation to 
raise this capacity to 465 TWh by 2100, especially in southern and eastern Europe.  
When the impacts of climate change on the technical potential of hydroelectricity generation 
are taken into account in POLES, significant consequences for the level of hydro generation are 
apparent. It has not been possible to analyse precipitation, surface run-off, river flow and water 
withdrawals differentiated by season in detail at catchment level, but only variations in average annual 
precipitation obtained from climate models. Some indicative estimates of the potential scale of impacts 
in the future EU electricity system have nevertheless been identified. The results vary strongly 
according to the climate models (see Figure 8), due to the various models predicting very contrasting 
shifts in precipitation. At a global level, the A1B scenario results show an overall decrease in EU 
European hydro-generation due to climate change of around 3% in 2050 and 8% in 2100, compared 
to the baseline case without climate-change impacts. The impacts are lower for the E1 scenario with 
respectively down about 2 and 3%. 
Figure 8: Impact of climate change on EU27 hydroelectricity generation 
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Source:  
POLES model, PACTE - pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project  
 
                                                     
11 Note that impacts of future extremes, as heavy precipitation events, heat-waves, possible changes in storms or future sea 
level rise have not been taken into account in this study. 
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For estimating the aggregated impact of climate change on EU27 energy supply in A1B and 
E1 scenarios we show in the Figure 9 the mean of the impacts of corresponding climate model 
projections on nuclear, thermal and hydroelectricity generation. In the A1B and E1 scenarios climate 
change impacts on hydroelectric generation amount to about 20% and 10%, respectively, of the total 
aggregated impact. 
Figure 9: Aggregated impact of climate change on EU27 energy supply in A1B and E1 
scenarios 
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The impacts vary depending on the region. Results indicate decreasing discharge volumes 
for southern, eastern and central Europe, falling by more than 20% in some countries, whereas the 
projected increases in discharge volumes for northern European countries may at times exceed 20%. 
This analysis makes no allowance for annual variability. Regarding specific countries, the French 
power-generation system seems the most impacted in the EU, losing about 40 TWh per year, 
equivalent to the output of five new nuclear power plants. This would need to be replaced somehow. 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Poland form a second group of severely affected countries, with a drop 
of about 20 TWh per year due to climate change. 
Ultimately the impact of climate change on electricity generation will alter the generation mix, 
which will obviously affect the average production cost of electricity. We have consequently started by 
estimating the total cost of electricity generation for each country in the baseline scenarios without 
climate impacts, and then with impacts. The cost of climate change through changing conditions for 
thermal, nuclear and hydroelectricity generation can then be assessed as the difference between the 
two total electricity generation costs.  
3.3. Overview of total climate-change impact on energy supply and 
demand 
Taken globally, aggregation of climate-change impacts on the energy sector, as estimated in 
this paper, shows mixed effects. For example, on the demand side, electricity demand for cooling in 
the EU27 in the A1B scenario is expected to increase by more than 50 Mtoe by 2100, whereas 
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heating demand is expected to decrease by about 65 Mtoe per year by 2100 (see Figure 10). It should 
be noted that comparison of the energy quantities consumed – less for heating and more for cooling – 
may hide impacts associated with the different nature of the energy carriers involved, respectively 
electricity and heating fuels. Under the E1 scenario, in which both the reduction in heating and the 
increase in cooling-energy are lower, the net effect is of course much lower than in the A1B scenario.  
Due to higher temperatures and lower precipitations, nuclear, thermal and hydro generation 
will be constrained compared to the corresponding scenarios without climate-change impacts. The 
highest decrease of around 200 TWh is estimated to occur in 2070 for the A1B scenario and with a 
150 TWh drop in 2060 and 2080 in the E1 scenario, whereas the impacts somehow decrease during 
the following period. The impacts of energy supply and demand cannot be aggregated, being different 
in nature, but the graphs on the right hand side of Figure 10 do show that the fall in electricity 
generation due to climate change is greater than the shifts in energy demand, even when the increase 
in electricity consumption for cooling is separated from the reduction in heating demand. Again, one 
should also bear in mind that there are substantial variations across the various climate-model runs 
considered and sizable differences even in the signs of the net effects across the EU.  
 
Figure 10: Climate-change impacts on EU27 energy supply and demand in the A1B 
and E1 scenarios (with average of climate impact scenarios) 
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Source:  
POLES model, PACTE - pôle EDDEN, Climate Cost project  
 
On a regional basis, the results for western Europe show that its heating consumption is 
more significantly impacted than elsewhere. Regarding the impact on cooling, it is more substantial in 
western and southern European countries (see Figure 11). The net effects of climate change on 
overall energy use remain limited; in all the regions except southern Europe, increases in cooling are 
more than compensated for by decreases in heating. 
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Figure 11: Climate-change impacts on energy demand in the A1B scenario by 
European region 
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The results show limited potential positive and negative effects in terms of the cost of energy 
consumption (consumption x prices) or total production costs. To assess the net effects of the impacts, 
we present both of them in the same graph (see Figure 12). The right hand graphs show the 
aggregate impacts on energy consumption costs, those in the middle the impacts on the supply side, 
and on the right the total impact. The greatest impact is apparent on the demand side, where warmer 
conditions lead to a $140 billion drop in EU27 heating expenditure corresponding to about 0.17% of 
projected EU27 GDP in 2100.  
However the costs of additional electricity consumption for air-conditioning in the residential 
and tertiary sector rise to about $130 billion in EU27 by the end of the period (corresponding to 0.16% 
of projected EU27 GDP). To this energy cost should be added the investment costs for new air 
conditioners ($7 billion). The corresponding costs are lower in the E1 scenario. We should emphasize 
that changes in annual energy costs either for heating or cooling, will not translate symmetrically into 
changes in equipment costs for heating or cooling: "those who enjoy decreased heating requirements 
cannot sell part of their existing furnaces (at best, there will be gradual decreases in heating system 
costs in new structures); on the other hand, those who have an increased need for cooling will buy 
additional air conditioners at once" (Ackerman & Stanton, 2008, p. 13).  
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The total impact costs, including supply side (about $100 billion in 2100) are estimated to 
increase by more $90 billion (see right graphs of Figure 12) representing 0.11% of projected EU GDP. 
Figure 12: Assessment of economic costs associated with climate-change impacts on 
EU27 energy supply and demand in the A1B and E1 scenarios 
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These values also do not take into account additional factors such as “urban heat island” 
effects in major European cities, which may further increase cooling demand. These are an important 
omission and could significantly change cooling demand patterns in the EU. These changes are also 
important in relation to mitigation policy; indeed, this is probably the single most important area for 
adaptation-mitigation linkages with potential positive feedbacks, i.e. rising cooling for adaptation 
inducing an increase in emissions or the reverse of a mitigation action, especially when the electricity 
required for cooling is even more carbon-intensive than the energy used for heating (e.g. gas, oil). 
There are also important cross-sectoral linkages with the health impacts of climate change and heat 
events, as well as wider comfort levels. For the time being it is impossible to estimate the cost of the 
impact of more frequent heat waves and droughts, which may push electricity costs far beyond the 
costs usually simulated in the model during periods of shortage. 
The study shows that ‘net’ impacts for Europe are slight. However, some distributional 
effects appear between the northern and southern regions of Europe. Expenditure for a heating 
decrease of about 0.6% of corresponding projected GDP in western and southern Europe, and 0.5% 
of GDP in eastern and northern Europe by 2100 for the A1B scenario. In the E1 scenario these costs 
vary between a 0.2% drop and a 0.25% increase depending on the region. In contrast southern 
countries are the most impacted for space-cooling as they are expected to spend an extra 0.3% of 
GDP in 2100 for that purpose.  
 
4. Conclusions and further research 
The results of the modelling, scenario development and analyses presented in this paper are 
highly preliminary and remain uncertain. However they do provide the basis for an initial assessment, 
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with sufficient detail, of the main impacts to be expected from climate change on the energy system in 
the European Union. Substantial work has been done with a soft link between the POLES model and 
the results of 10 climate models in order to quantify the most important impacts of climate change on 
energy supply and demand, by European country and region. No comparable work has yet been done 
to assess, in the same study, possible long-term effects of climate change: i) on heating and cooling in 
the residential and tertiary sectors; ii) on cooling constraints for nuclear and combustion-based thermal 
generation; and iii) on hydroelectricity generation.  
The outlook shows that global warming will impact both the supply and demand side of EU 
energy: higher temperatures will mean more energy for air-conditioning, up about 50 Mtoe by 2100 in 
the A1B scenarios, and less heating for consumers, down by about 65 Mtoe per year by 2100 with a 
net negative effect of climate change on energy demand by the end of the period, notwithstanding the 
change in the nature of demand, from heating fuel to cooling electricity. Operating conditions for 
electric power plants will also be more difficult and expensive, resulting in lower output by thermal, 
nuclear and hydro-power plants with a maximum loss of about 200 TWh in 2070 for the A1B scenario 
and 150 TWh in 2060 and 2080 for the E1 scenario.  
The results obtained also provide a first assessment of the costs of the impacts of climate 
change on the EU energy system. Energy expenditure on the demand side will decrease by $140 
billion in the EU27 by 2100 under the A1B scenario for heating and increase by $136 billion for space 
cooling. One important implication of these findings, for the economic impacts of climate change, 
concerns households, which would benefit from lower spending on heating energy. This will 
consequently decrease the incentives to invest into dwelling insulation. Overall the additional energy 
spent on cooling is less than the energy saved due to lower demand for heating; however the amount 
varies widely by region. There is a strong variation of the effects across Europe. The non-linear 
patterns are more pronounced in cold countries, such as Norway, where the net effect of temperature 
increases reduces total energy demand. In relatively mild countries, like Italy, higher demand for 
electricity during the summer is compensated by lower demand for gas, oil products and coal in winter 
and spring. In warm countries, such as Spain, the cooling effect increases energy demand. There is 
also a strong distributional pattern of the results from different climate models, revealing that the 
potential costs vary by +/-25% for the A1B scenario (2100), and could still be significant under a 
mitigation scenario, with high increases projected from the warmer models. 
On the supply side, climate change is likely to affect all renewable energy sources. Biomass 
potential may be positively impacted by higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations in 
moderate climates, but negatively by reduced water availability or extreme events in some regions. 
Changes in cloud cover may negatively influence the efficiency of photovoltaic plants. Whereas 
increasing average wind velocities may improve the electricity output of wind power plants (however, 
the extent of increasing wind velocities for Europe is still unknown), higher frequencies of serious 
storms may negatively affect total annual wind-power generation and even destroy wind turbines, 
cutting power output. But assessment is difficult and these impacts need further investigation.  
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However the impacts of expected changes in average temperature rise, or precipitation and 
hydrological regimes can already be considered for thermal power and hydro power generation. Our 
estimates are based on average regional climate changes, for temperature and precipitation. They 
show a decrease of European hydro generation due to climate change of around 3% in 2050 and 8% 
in 2100, compared to the case without climate change. Furthermore, the results estimate that thermal 
and nuclear power generation could be constrained respectively by 2-3% and 4-5% per year due to 
changes in CDD in the A1B scenarios. This type of analysis should be complemented in the future by 
taking into account extreme events. Indeed the most severe climate strains on the electricity sector will 
be increasingly intense heat waves. During a heat wave, local grids can be pushed to the limit of their 
capacity simply by the large number of air-conditioning units operating simultaneously. Heat waves 
and droughts (both expected to become more common, according to the IPCC) will push the costs of 
electricity during times of shortage well beyond the costs included in our model. Extreme weather 
events, including storms, damage electricity transmission lines. The vulnerability of electricity 
transmission may vary across different countries and regions, depending on the age and type of this 
infrastructure: aerial or underground cabling (COM 2009). Some efforts are emerging for quantifying 
increased transmission losses due to temperature rises (Reiter & Turton, 2010). 
The study has considered uncertainty by considering a large range of climate model outputs 
for A1B and E1 scenarios. POLES simulate the complex interactions between energy demand and 
supply and climate change. Every added complexity, while intended to improve some aspect of 
simulated energy demand and supply, also introduces new sources of possible error (e.g., via 
uncertain parameters). Furthermore, despite the progress that has been made in climate models, 
scientific uncertainty regarding the details of many processes remains. The soft-linkage of the POLES 
model with climate models is still very rough. Better integration is needed with other climate and 
hydrological models and many improvements are necessary, such as better representation of the 
relationship between changes in precipitation and temperature. Obviously the overview of the effects 
of climate change on the energy sector depend on a large number of very uncertain climate change 
parameters such as expected changes in average temperature increases, in precipitation amounts or 
hydrological regimes12. Furthermore, the effects depend on a wide range of uncertain factors beyond 
climate change alone, such as patterns of economic and population growth, technological change.  
Finaly, it is necessary also to bear in mind, the limits of modelling either with the POLES 
model or climate models which are inherently uncertain. The uncertainty in calculations poses strong 
limitations to the interpretation of the results. 
In spite of the remaining uncertainties, this study is a step forward in our understanding of 
major climate impacts and of their costs for the EU energy system under scenarios that reflect different 
policy trade-offs in terms of adaptation versus mitigation. It already shows that the low mitigation 
scenarios involve a higher vulnerability of the EU energy system and particularly its electricity system 
component. 
                                                     
12 Unexpected and dramatic climate events have not even been taken into account. 
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